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ABSTRACT
CORRELATED AND DECORRELATED ALARM SYSTEMS: A SIGNAL
DETECTION THEORY ANALYSIS
ElRif, Paul, Michel
University of Dayton
Advisor: Greg Elvers, Ph.D.
Previous alarm system studies have assumed that an automated alarm 
and an human observer are sampling distributions that are independent of each 
other (rather than being on some continuum). This study investigates 
differences between correlated (r = 1.0) and decorrelated (r = 0.0) observations 
of the automated alarm, and the human observer. In an actual alarm system,
the correlation between the observations of the human detector and the
automated detector probably range from r = 0.0 to r = 1.0.
This study investigates such factors as d' system when observers and 
machine were given either the same four numbers or four different numbers 
taken from the same distribution. Half the time the observer and computer 
were given the same four numbers and half the time they were given different
IV
numbers. Observers and the automated detector (in this case a computer) were 
expected to add these numbers and decide if the averaged sum came from one 
of two overlapping distributions. Observers were also given the computer's 
calculation to aid in their decision. Along with the detection task, observers 
were given an unstable tracking task.
In this study there were no significant differences between the correlated and 
decorrelated groups. However, suggestions for future studies are discussed.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
Signal Detection Theory
A signal detection system can be described as a system that monitors data 
for potentially abnormal situations. The origins of signal detection theory (SDT) 
can be traced to Green and Swets (1966). SDT is a mathematical model that 
allows one to predict the probability that an observer will detect a signal 
embedded in noise. Essentially this means that the observer is not a passive 
receiver of signals. Signal detection theory operates under the assumption that 
there is always noise in the system.
Smoke detectors can be considered a signal detection device. In terms of a 
smoke detector analogy, Figure 1 can be interpreted in the following way. The 
input, particulates of smoke, are the composites of the byproducts of 
combustion. In the first box, these particulates are combined by the smoke 
detector and converted to "Z," a unidimensional statistic. Z is calculated so that 
the components of smoke can be integrated into one numerical figure. The 
second box represents the comparison the smoke detector makes. If there is 
enough information about the presence of smoke (i.e. Z is greater than C), then a 
"signal" decision is made; otherwise no response in made. C is the amount of
1
2information, in this case smoke, that the detector requires in order to make a
"yes there is smoke" decision.
Stored data 
about smoke 
particulates
Payoffs, costs, associated 
with detecting smoke
Figure 1. A basic signal detection system using the smoke detector 
analogy.
In general (see Figure 2), the first measurement/observation is an input 
vector called X; this measurement is considered as part of a multidimensional 
input vector. Based on computations in the first box a unidimensional statistic, 
Z, is computed. Z is established by considering the observation vector and by 
considering stored information about expected characteristics of signal and non­
signal happenings. As a matter of convenience, the decision dimension Z is
considered normalized; it follows that the standard deviation of the
distributions (to be described) is equal to unity. The separation of the means is
3defined as d'. Therefore, d' and C are also couched in standard deviate units
(Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
Input
X
Stored data Payoffs, costs,
about X P(SN), P(N)
1
Z = g(X) z ► z> c?
Yes
or
No
Figure 2. A basic signal detection system.
Signal detection theory has two parameters, d' and C. d' is a measure of 
sensitivity which can be described as an ascending likelihood; the higher the dz 
value, the higher the probability of a hit (correct detection), and the lower the 
probability of a false alarm (i.e. if p(hit) = p (FA) then d' = 0). d' often takes on 
values higher than 1 and is the difference between two normalized distributions 
with a standard deviation of one (1), and one of the distributions having a mean 
of zero (0) ( d' = ((Isn- (In) / SD )k Ad' value of 0 indicates performance at 
chance level, d' values above 2 are considered good; and d' values above 3 are
4considered very sensitive. In terms of the smoke detector analogy, the higher d'
is, the more sensitive the detector is.
Another component of SDT is C. C is the response criterion; it is the 
amount of information needed to make a "signal" response. C measures how 
liberal or conservative a detector (or system) is. C is often set to maximize some 
constraint. It is the value that partitions the Z statistic into "yes, there is a signal" 
and "no, there is no signal" categories. If the Z statistic is equal to or greater 
than C, then the output will be "signal." C is most often chosen based on prior 
signal or noise probabilities, as well as costs and benefits associated with 
possible detection outcomes (correct/incorrect detection, correct/incorrect 
rejection) (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984). In terms of the smoke detector analogy, C 
would be a setting that would maximize the benefits of owning a smoke 
detector yet not be so liberal as to become a nuisance that is soon ignored.
A detection system's ability to discriminate noise and signal-plus-noise 
events depends on the probability density of the Z statistic (see Figure 3). The 
likelihood of obtaining a particular Z statistic based on noise alone is: f(Z | N). 
The likelihood of obtaining a particular Z statistic based on a signal-plus-noise 
event is: f(Z | SN). Ideally these distributions would be widely spaced and
would have low variance. If this were the case there would be few errors in
attributing a given value of Z to a signal-plus-noise distribution or to a noise-
An exception would be if, for example, gN = 0 then d' = (SN/ SD).
5only distribution (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984). Sorkin & Robinson (1984) claim 
that the assumption that the distributions on Z are normal/Gaussian is a 
reasonable approximation of how many detection systems behave.
Figure 3. Theoretical probability densities.
One way to think of C is that it is the response criterion parameter that 
specifies how much information is needed in order to come up with a "yes" 
(Sorkin & Robinson, 1984). The probability of a "yes" given a signal is:
00
P (y | SN) = P [ (Z > C) | SN] = J f (Z | SN) dZ 
C
Whereas the probability of a 'yes' given no signal:
00
P (y I N) = P [ (Z > C) I N] = J f (Z I N) dZ 
C
6The third major component of SDT is (3. p is the ratio of the height of the 
SN distribution to the height of the N distribution at C
P = [/(C |SN]/[/(C |N)J.
Any signal detection task has four possible outcomes. 1) When a signal 
embedded in noise is correctly identified, it is called a "hit." 2) When no signal 
is embedded in noise, but it is identified as being a signal, it is called a "false 
alarm." 3) When a signal embedded in noise is not detected, it is called a 
"missed signal," or a "miss." 4) When no signal is there and is correctly 
identified, it is called a "correct rejection."
Sorkin and Robinson (1984) contend that optimal p (Popt) is a function of 
the a priori possibilities linked to either the presence (P(SN)), or the absence 
(P(N)) of a signal -along with the values and costs associated with the possible 
outcomes of an observation. The following list represents the values associated 
with each of the choices (taken from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984):
V (y | SN), Value associated with a hit.
V (n | SN), Value (cost) associated with a miss.
V (y | N), Value associated with a false alarm.
V (n | N), Value associated with a correct rejection.
7Popt = {P(N) [V (n | N)-V(y | N)]} / {P (SN) [V (n | SN)-V(y | SN)]}
popt is optimal in that a criterion based upon popt will maximize the expected 
value (EV). Thus:
EV = V (y | SN) P (SN) P (y | SN) - V (y , N) P (N) P (y | N)
+ V (n | N) P (N) P (n | N) - V (n | SN) P (SN) P (n | SN)
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC's -figure 4) are plots of the 
probability of a hit versus the probability of a false alarm. These probabilities are 
computed based on a fixed d'.
8Liberal and conservative observers:
As the value of C moves to the left, there will be an increase in both hits 
and false alarm rates. An observer who adopts this strategy is considered liberal. 
As the value of C moves to the right, there will be fewer hits and false alarms. 
Observers who adopt this strategy are considered conservative. Observers tend 
to weigh the costs and values of a decision in order to arrive at a particular bias.
9On the ROC curve, as values move from 0,0 to 1,1, there is a
corresponding increase in both hits and false alarms. The closer one is to 0, 0 the 
more conservative a detector they are. The closer a detector is to 1,1 the more 
liberal they become.
The Alerted Monitor System
In certain situations human operator workload can be heavy. For example, 
on aircraft flight decks, or in a control room for a nuclear power plant (Sorkin & 
Robinson, 1984; Sorkin & Woods, 1985) operators are often distracted by 
multiple tasks. The addition of an automated detector (of abnormal events), in 
many cases, can arguably increase the sensitivity of the system (Pollack & 
Madans, 1964; Sorkin & Robinson, 1984; Sorkin & Woods, 1985).
Sorkin and Robinson (1984) briefly describe the general model of the 
alerted monitor system. They describe it as consisting of two signal detection 
stages. The first stage is an automated detector stage; the second stage is the 
human detector stage. Each stage has its own parameters in respect to sensitivity 
and response criterion. The sensitivity parameters are usually constrained by 
practical considerations mostly having to do with the environment in which the 
system resides. Cajarm (Ca) is usually set to what is considered a reasonable
level for a particular environment. The problem lies in determining where to set
10
Ca in order to accommodate a busy human operator -especially since operator
workload is constantly changing. In an alerted monitor subsystem the operator 
is alerted by the automated alarm and makes a decision to confirm or ignore an 
alarm. This system acknowledges that the operator is probably engaged in tasks 
other than monitoring for a signal.
Alerted monitor systems can be thought of as an automated detector that 
displays a message as to whether a set-point (a.k.a. threshold value or "C") is 
exceeded. When the condition falls outside of the set range, the display alerts the 
operator. Once alerted, the human operator can analyze the situation and either
confirm or disconfirm the automated alarm's decision.
Alerted monitor system & the smoke detector analogy (Sorkin & Robinson,
1984):
This analogy uses a smoke alarm as the automated detector. Signal 
detection theory follows the assumption that the alerted monitor (smoke 
detector) has two independent dimensions: 1) a discriminability dimension, d', 
and 2) a response dimension, p or C. The discriminability dimension defines the 
detector's sensitivity in discriminating between fire and no-fire conditions. A 
high discriminability dimension means that a smoke detector will rarely mistake
11
a fire and no-fire condition. The response dimension determines how liberal or
conservative a detector is.
Signal detection theory assumes that sensitivity and criterion are 
independent of each other. Regardless of how sensitive a smoke detector is, its 
responses are limited to where its criterion is set. Regardless of the detector's 
sensitivity index, the smoke detector's criterion, C, will determine when it will
alert.
In the design phase of a smoke detector, it would make sense to set the 
alarm so that its sensitivity can be maximized in light of costs. However, the 
decision of where to set the criterion of the alarm (Ca) can pose a dilemma: The
designer needs to set the criterion to a liberal setting in order to minimize the 
chance of the detector overlooking a potential fire. Nevertheless if the designer 
establishes the criterion at too liberal a setting, the human operator will soon 
ignore the alarm. The result of too many false alarms is a "cry wolf" syndrome 
(Seminara, Gonzalez & Parsons 1977). What this means is that if, for example, a 
smoke detector is set to be very liberal, the human may eventually begin to 
ignore the alarm. Obviously this strategy will yield a low system d'. Thus the 
optimal placement of Ca may be dependent on the strategy employed by the
human observer.
Signal detection theory (SDT) views the alerted monitor system as a two- 
stage system comprised of an automated detector that is cascaded with a human
12
detector (see figure 5). Figure 6 is a model of the alerted monitor system as it 
would apply to the smoke detector analogy. In both figures (5 and 6), stages are 
specified by their own sensitivity and response bias. The overall sensitivity and 
bias of the system will depend on how the sensitivity and bias of each stage are
set.
Using the smoke detector analogy in figure 5, X is the input vector. Xa is
the smoke detector, and Xh is the human detector. Za is the unidimensional
statistic calculated by the automated detector, and Zh is the unidimensional 
statistic calculated by the human detector. Computation of the Z statistic can be 
seen as the sensitivity of the detector. If either Z statistic is greater than the 
criterion of the respective detector then a check is made. In the case of the smoke 
alarm, an alarm goes off. In the case of the human a fire-check is made. The 
model acknowledges that the input vector (smoke) and input from the smoke 
alarm are two separate sources of information. This model also assumes that the 
human detector is not bound to any particular strategy in responding (these 
strategies will be described later).
13
input
X
Figure 5. The signal detection model of an alerted monitor system (Adapted
from Sorkin and Woods, 1985)
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/ XS
input
X
(smoke)
Figure 6. The signal detection model of the smoke detector analogy (Adapted 
from previous diagram).
Decision Rules
Pollack and Madans (1964) discuss the combination of two hypothetical 
detectors. They indicate that the performance of the combination of detectors 
can be as poor as the poorer of the detector's performance alone. Pollack and 
Madans base their assumptions on a study by Swets, Birdsall & Tanner (1961)
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Swets et al., state that a combination of detectors can operate under a number of 
different decision rules. Swets et al. offer two decision rules to explain these 
assumptions:
1) The first equation/decision rule is called a (n, n) decision rule. Based on this 
rule both detectors must respond "no signal" in order for the system to respond 
"no signal;" otherwise the system will respond "signal." This decision rule 
increases the correct acceptance rate as well as the incorrect acceptance rate. 
When each detector operates under high acceptance rates, and the system 
operates under the (n,n) decision rule, there is higher system discriminability.
2) The second decision rule is called the (y, y) decision rule. This rule requires 
both detectors to respond "signal" in order for the system to respond "signal;" 
otherwise the system will respond "no signal." This decision rule causes a 
decrement in system performance; since both the correct acceptance rate and the 
correct rejection rate is reduced (as is the incorrect acceptance rate). However, 
when each of the detectors operates under low acceptance rates, and the system 
operates under the (y, y) decision rule, there is higher system discriminability.
Pollack and Madans (1964) then performed a series of experiments to test 
the assumptions of Swets et al. (1961). Subjects listened for either the presence or 
absence of a tonal signal embedded in noise. In one condition, an automated 
detector set at chance performance aided subjects. The second condition had 
subjects aided by an automated detector that had the same discriminability as
16
the listener. Both aided listeners had better performances than unaided listeners 
-although the performance fell short of an "ideal combination." The authors 
conclude that gains in system performance should be viewed with caution. 
Moreover, they argue against the indiscriminate combination of automated 
detectors and listeners, since performance of the aided listener was not 
appreciably higher than the performance of unaided listeners or the automated
detector alone.
The contingent criterion model
The contingent criterion model (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984; Robinson & 
Sorkin, 1985) is a prediction model that incorporates an automated alarm and a 
human. The model is based on signal detection theory. The gist of the model is 
that the human establishes two response criteria based on either an alarm or no­
alarm from an automated detector.
In the contingent criterion model, the human monitor's sensitivity is 
defined as d'p,, and the automated monitor's sensitivity is defined as d'a. When
the automated alarm and the human make independent observations of the 
same noise distribution, then detectability is at or approaches d'Opt (optimal). 
This is because both detectors are observing unique information. d'Opt is the 
square root of the sum of squares of the two detectors (Robinson & Sorkin, 
1985).
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When there is an automated alarm being monitored by a human detector, 
d'opt may n°t be achieved. d'Opt can not be reached when the observations 
made by the automated detector are not available to the human detector 
(Robinson & Sorkin, 1985). This is because both detectors are observing different
distributions.
Robinson & Sorkin (1985) state that in order to calculate how a human 
operator should operate in order to maximize system performance (in lieu of a 
binary response of the alarm system), the following guidelines should be
followed:
The value of p that maximizes the expected value, for a single detector, is a 
determinant of the a priori probabilities coupled with values and costs. The a 
priori 'signal' and 'no-signal' probabilities can be altered provided the human 
has knowledge of the first detector's response. If the human has knowledge of 
the first detector's a priori probability, and hit and false alarm rates, then the 
post hoc probability can be computed using Bayes' theorem.
Bayes' theorem is a mathematical model for estimating the a posteriori 
probability that a hypothesis is true from the a priori probability that the 
hypothesis is true and the conditional probability of a piece of evidence in light 
of the hypothesis. The theorem serves as a prescriptive or normative model for 
specifying the means of appraising the probability of a hypothesis (Anderson, 
1988).
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Estimates of the post hoc probability will be conditional on the first 
detector responding "yes"; and on the first detector responding "no." These post 
hoc probabilities can then be used as the a priori probability in order to establish 
two values of p, pyes (py), and Pno (Pn); as well as Cyes (Cy) and Cno (Cn). For the 
second detector to operate optimally, it must have a priori knowledge of both its 
own 'hit/ and 'false alarm' rate, find that of the first detector. Moreover it must 
have knowledge of its own sensitivity and of germane values and costs 
(Robinson & Sorkin, 1985).
The second detector will now invoke two criteria: Cy and Cn. These criteria 
result in two probabilities that can be utilized to obtain 'hit' (Py (y | SN) and Pn 
(y | SN)) and 'false alarm' (Py (y | N) and Pn (y | N)) and probabilities for 
the combined detectors (Robinson & Sorkin, 1985). Thus the probabilities of the 
combined detectors are given by:
Pah (y | SN) =Pa (y | SN) [Py (y | SN) - Pn (Y | SN)] + Pn (y | SN)
And
Pah(y IN) =Pa(y |N)[Py(y |N)-Pn(y |N)] + Pn(y |N)
19
The contingent criterion model almost always shows 
efficiency/performance gains over any single detector. Figure T2 (Adapted from 
Sorkin & Robinson 1984) illustrates the sensitivity of the combined detectors 
(d'ah) as being a function of the automated detector's false alarm rate. Sorkin 
and Robinson (1984) performed a series of computer simulations to try and 
determine the system operating characteristics of a series of models (like the 
contingent criterion model). These graphs are known as SOC's (system 
operating characteristics) -as opposed to ROC's because the curves do not reach 
to (1,1)- Sorkin and Robinson (1984) varied Ca in order to vary the false alarm 
rate of the automated detector, d'h was set at 2.0. The curves are for d'a = 1.0, 
d'a = 2.0, and d'a = 3.0. For all three curves d'ah is always greater than the two 
singular d' values. Also, as Pa (y | N) approaches 0.0 or 1.0, d'ah approaches d'h- 
The maximum values of d'ah are when pa = 1.0. In every case there is a system
gain. Because d'opt = d>’, for d'h = 2.0 and d'ah = 1.0, d'ah = 2.0. and d'ah
= 3.0, the comparable d'Opt values are: 2.24, 2.83, and 3.61 (The d'ah values are 
very close to these values) (Sorkin & Robinson 1984)
2 note. Sorkin & Robinson's 1984 assumptions are based on Monte Carlo studies.
20
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st
em
 d
'
Figure 73. (Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
Figure 8 illustrates what happens when d'a = 2.0 and d'h = 1.0, d'h = 2.0. and 
d'h = 3.0. In this graph, each curve begins and ends with d'ah = d'h. Once again 
there is a system gain (Sorkin & Robinson 1984). *
3 "DI" should read "d'a" and "D2" should read "d'h"
21
First Detector, P(Y pj)
Figure 84. (Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
Figure 9 illustrates that if two detectors are not equally sensitive, the one that is 
more sensitive is of critical significance. When d'h > d'a5 the function relating
4 "DI" should read "d'a" and "D2" should read "d'h"
5 "d'a "is referred to as "di" and "d'h" is referred to as "d2."
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d'ah to Pa (y | N) is relatively flat (Sorkin & Robinson 1984).
Figure 9. (Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
Sorkin and Woods' (1984) results indicate that the Contingent Criterion 
model does a reasonably accurate job of predicting the data. They say that the 
alerted monitor model provides a relatively simple mathematical structure for 
the evaluation of alerted monitor systems. The model enables the designer to 
determine the effects on system performance of the relationships between the 
automated and human components. Also, it can determine optimal settings of 
subsystem parameters in order to acquire desirable system hit and false alarm
23
rates. Furthermore, it can specify what information is necessary for optimal 
training of the human operator.
Sorkin and Robinson's (1984) studies
The purpose of Sorkin and Robinson's (1984) studies was to address the 
problem faced by operators of equipment in high workload situations where an 
automated alarm is assisting . Automated alarms assist human operators in 
detection and diagnosis of problems in monitoring processes. The authors claim 
that in many alerted monitor situations such as air traffic control centers, and 
flight decks of commercial air liners, the signals that are put out by the 
automated detectors are often ignored. Automated signals may be ignored 
because in the design phase little attention was paid to optimizing settings for 
the combination of automated and human detectors. Subsequently, human 
operators respond inappropriately when alerted by an automated detector. 
(Hanson, Boucek, Smith, Chikos, Hendrickson, Howison, & Berson, 1982; Sorkin 
& Robinson, 1984). This study will attempt to partially replicate a previous 
study by Sorkin and Robinson (1984). Sorkin and Robinson's (1984) study was 
an experiment designed to evaluate the assumptions of the alerted monitor 
system (Pollack & Madans, 1964; Robinson & Sorkin, 1985; Sorkin & Woods, 
1985; Sorkin, Kantowitz & Kantowitz, 1988). Sorkin and Robinson's (1984) 
experiment was consistent (albeit marginally below) with predictions made by 
the contingent criterion (CC) model.
24
The results of Sorkin and Robinson's (1984) study allowed them to 
develop a general model of the alerted monitor system. This model holds that 
the seriousness of many abnormal process states is enough to encourage an 
operator to make observations/checks independent of whether or not the 
automated subsystem is alerting them. This general model of the alerted 
monitor system takes this into account and incorporates it. When an operator 
makes observations independent of the automated monitor, more complex 
system performance analyses are required. This sort of analysis lends itself well 
to the contingent criterion (CC) model. Results further showed that the 
contingent criterion strategy can often yield near optimal performance.
Two experiments that involved human subjects (as opposed to the 
computer simulations that were previously described in the Sorkin & Woods, 
1984 study) were performed to evaluate the assumptions of the contingent 
criterion model, as well as to observe interactions between the human detector 
and the automated detector. The first experiment had subjects aided by an 
automated detector, detecting auditory signals. The second experiment had 
subjects aided by an automated detector diagnose instrument readings while 
simultaneously performing a secondary task. The result of these experiments 
show that system performance in both cases was consistent albeit marginally 
below the predicted level of the contingent criterion model. The results of these 
experiments also point out that system performance can be improved by
25
providing an automated detector. However system performance is dependent 
on the interaction between the human operator and the automated detector.
Sorkin and Woods (1985) suggest a number of environments that are 
appropriate for systems with human monitors. For example, they cite flight 
decks of commercial aircraft, control rooms of nuclear power plants, and 
automated factories as decision-making environments that include a human 
operator in an alerted monitor role.
Sorkin and Woods (1985) model the combined system as a signal detection 
system that employs a human monitor and an automated monitor that observe 
partially correlated channels. The results indicate that overall system 
performance is very sensitive to the interaction between the human monitor's 
strategy and Ca. Design protocol tends to dictate that Ca is set to a value that
optimizes the automated monitor's detection and false alarm rate. Sorkin and 
Woods' study indicates that this setting does not yield optimal overall human- 
machine system performance. In fact overall system performance is probably 
limited to a narrow range of detection and error rates.
Sorkin et al. (1988), performed a study where event likelihood was 
computed by an automated monitoring system, and the outcome was presented 
as an alerting signal to the human operator. The display is known as a likelihood 
alarm display (LAD). LADs address the possibility that a four-stage alarm may, 
in some situations, be better than binary alarms.
26
Most alarm systems employ a binary type of signal (either "signal" or "no 
signal"). Most alerted monitor systems do not optimally combine observations. 
This is because the operator tends to be busy with other tasks, and does not have 
the attentional resources available to attend solely to a binary alarm. Also, the 
human operator and the automated detector are not drawing their samples from 
identical distributions. Because of this Sorkin et al. (1988) say that the system 
will generally perform below optimal settings.
Sorkin et al. (1988) developed a system where four levels of danger were 
conveyed by the automated detector: 1) no alarm, 2) "possible danger," 3) 
"probably danger," and 4) "certain danger." Based on these alerts, a busy 
human operator can make judgments as to how urgently the alarm needs to be 
attended to (in light of other ongoing tasks).
Providing information in this format allows human operators to allocate 
resources in order to complete tasks. Since this type of format is more 
information-rich than a binary type of alarm, the priority of the alarm would 
allow the human operator the chance to decide the urgency of the situation. 
Nevertheless, this type of alarm can also produce decrements in the human 
operator's performance as well.
LADs can be understood in context of the two-stage system having an 
automated alarm and a human monitor (AKA the alerted monitor system), in
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that the automated alarm feeds information to the human monitor and the
human monitor uses this information to aid in decision making.
Sorkin et al. (1988) discovered that in tasks with low demands, the 
complex alarms yield the same improvement as simple (binary) alarm displays 
over no alarm displays. However, in situations with high task demands, there 
was an improvement in performance and accuracy with the four-state alarm 
over the two-state alarm. The authors also suggest that in many situations LADs 
do not add to the operator's attentional load.
Dependent criterion strategy and d' allocation strategy
Pollack and Madans (1964) investigated a two-stage system where the 
human operator only monitors the noisy channel when alerted by the 
automated alarm. They discovered that the maximal d' was when both systems 
had equal sensitivities and response criteria. They also discovered that for 
intermediate response criteria, maximal system performance was roughly 1.2 d'; 
this is approximately a 20% performance advantage for a two-stage system 
(Sorkin & Robinson, 1984), but less than the optimal V2d’2 = 1.41d'.
System performance can be affected by different forms of interaction 
between the automated detector and the human detector (Pollack & Madans, 
1964, Sorkin & Robinson, 1984). Interaction between the human detector's 
parameters (d'^ and C^) and the criterion set for the automated monitor (Ca)
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affect the overall system performance. Obviously, the higher d'a and d'^ the
better system performance will be. Sorkin and Robinson (1984) consider that as 
a possible strategy, the human operator will generally change operating 
characteristics from one situation to another. On occasion, the human operator 
becomes dependent on Ca; then becomes a function of Ca- What this means
is that if the automated alarm's criterion is set to a particular level this could 
lead the human operator to become dependent on more evidence in order to 
confirm the alarm's decision. This is known as the dependent criterion strategy. For 
example, if an alarm becomes more liberal, and false alarms increase, the human 
operator may become more conservative. This scenario would yield a system 
operating characteristic similar to Figure 10 that peaks very quickly then falls off 
even more rapidly (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
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Figure 10. Dependent criterion strategy SOC (Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 
1984).
Acceptable system performance is restricted to a narrow range of low 
output rates from the automated detector. At moderate to high output rates, 
system performance is solely limited to the sensitivity and criterion placement of 
the automated detector alone. (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
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Dependence of d'^ on
In some situations high alarm rates can lead to human operators ignoring 
alarms, or spending less time observing or detecting. In a situation where an 
operator is busy, and attentional resources are taken up by the tasks at hand, a 
liberal alarm could easily be attended to less. There are two types of strategies 
that can be observed by the operator in a situation like this: First is the operator 
sampling strategy. The second strategy, the d'-allocation strategy allows for the 
operator to make observations on the input channel, but with a reduced d'.
Under the operator sampling strategy, all subsets of the alerted events are 
ignored except one. Figure 6 shows that the operator observes the input channel 
with a probability (P(observe)). This graphic assumes P(observe) linearly 
decreases from 1.0 (when the alert rate, P(alarm), is equal to 0.0), to 0.5 (when 
the alert rate, P(alarm), is equal to 1.0). Each of the curves in Figure 6 is the 
system operating characteristic for a fixed value of Ca and all possible values of
Ch- In this case, d'a = d'h = 2. It is assumed that the human monitor will make
observations on the input channel at a probability rate that decreases in a linear 
fashion commensurate with the alarm rate of the automated monitor; P 
(observe) = 1 - [P(alarm)/2], When an alarm occurs relatively infrequently, 
operators tend to make observations on the input channel on every occurrence. 
When alarms occur very frequently, operators will make observations on half of 
those occasions. The human monitor makes observations on the input channel
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on at least half of the alerted events. Therefore, it is not an unreasonable
assumption that observations would be made half of the time when alarms are 
very frequent. When the operator does not make observations, the system 
assumes a "no signal' response (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
In Figure 11 each curve corresponds to both a fixed value of Ca and a
corresponding value of P(observe) that is assessed at all values of Ch- When 
P(alarm) is high (i.e. Ca has a negative value), operating characteristics are close 
to chance levels (e.g. the d' = 0.5 curve). Generally, operator sampling strategies 
tend to produce system operating characteristics in the lower left quadrant of an 
SOC graph. When sampling probabilities approach 0.0, system operating 
characteristics approach chance (Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
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Figure 11. SOC for a fixed value of Ca and corresponding value of P(observe) 
(Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
An example of an operator sampling strategy would be warning signals 
on a flight deck of an aircraft. If the flight crew is busy, a warning signal may be 
canceled as soon as it occurs -without ever investigating the input channel 
(Hanson et al, 1982; Sorkin & Robinson, 1984). Another example is the Air 
Florida flight 90 crash into the 14th street bridge in Washington D.C. The pilots 
were perhaps too busy at takeoff to be able to attend to the stickshaker and to
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the alarm associated with the stickshaker and loss of lift. This resulted in over 70
fatalities (National Transportation Safety Board, 1982).
Another strategy, the d'-allocation strategy, operates under the 
assumption that there are detection capacity limits that can be assigned to the 
alarm channel. In this case all events are observed by the operator; but higher 
alerting rates lead to decreased operator d'. When operating under this strategy, 
it is necessary to assume that operator capacity is being allocated to a series of 
observations. Sorkin and Robinson (1984) posit the following functions
2involving d'h and its relation to P(alarm): The first assumption is that d'h
decreases in a linear fashion with the number of observed events. So, d'h = d'a
>/l - P(alarm) where d'a = 2.0. The second function assumes d'h = 4.0 when there 
are very few alerting events; this value decreases to 0.5 when P(alarm) is high 
(d'h = ^d'a /[7P(alann) +1]) where d'a = 2.0. Figures 12 and 13 illustrate these
operating characteristics respectively. The differences in the way that particular 
parameters are chosen dictate the rate the system operating curve shifts towards 
chance (for increasing negative Ca values). In Figures 12 and 13 each of the 
curves is a system operating curve for a fixed value of Ca and all possible values 
of Ch. In Figure 13 the curves meet on the SOC that would fit a single-stage 
system with a d' = 1.0.
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Figure 12. SOC for d' allocation strategy for a fixed value of Ca and all possible 
values of Ch (Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
35
P(YJM)
Figure 13. SOC for d' allocation strategy for a fixed value of Ca and all possible 
values of Ch (Adapted from Sorkin & Robinson, 1984).
Correlation between monitors
The human operator and the automated detector do not necessarily 
sample the same noisy input vector (information). The data provided to the 
automated detector (Xa) and to the human detector (XpJ are sometimes not
available to each other. For example the automated detector may have
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sophisticated data gathering and evaluation techniques that are not within the 
human's capabilities. The measurement techniques of the automated detector 
and the human detector may also be different. Furthermore, the human detector 
may use heuristics or contextual data that the automated detector may not be 
capable of gathering.
Other differences between the automated and human detector include the
difference in where the sample is extracted. In the case of an alarm system in a 
large building, chances are the automated detector and the human operator will 
be sampling very different data; in this instance the correlation between the 
sampled information would be lower. In a chemical plant the automated 
detector is more likely to be sampling data that the human operator is not 
capable of monitoring (e.g., certain chemicals are odorless; this is an example of 
a low correlation between detectors).
Previous studies have employed designs that use de-correlated samples.
In the case of de-correlated samples, system d' will naturally be high; therefore, 
benefits will outweigh costs. The assumption that displays are de-correlated is 
untenable; in the real world they range from being decorrelated to being 
perfectly correlated. This study suggests that when the system is correlated, 
system d' should suffer. Therefore, in this case costs may well outweigh benefits.
Sorkin and Robinson (1984) discuss the effect of various assumptions of 
the two-stage detection system (The overall detectability of a two-stage system
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is calculated by \2d'2 ). The overall performance of the system will tend to be
lower than the optimal value because the human operator usually only observes 
the noisy channel when alerted by the automated alarm. In this case d'Opt 
assumes all information is used when the human observes. Also, the human 
only monitors when the alarm goes off, and not when the alarm does not go off. 
This is only true if d'a = d' h and r = 0. In general, under the previous
assumption:
Until now these types of studies have assumed that the automated alarm 
and the human observer are sampling distributions that are independent of each 
other (rather than being on some continuum). This study looked at differences 
between correlated (r=l) and uncorrelated (r=0) observations of the automated 
alarm, and the human observer. In an actual system, the correlation between the 
observations of the human detector and the automated detector probably range 
from r = 0.0 to r = 1.0. Using the smoke detector analogy, the detector is 
probably sampling air close to the ceiling, whereas the human is sampling air
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closer to the floor. The human observer can make visual checks, whereas the 
smoke detector can not. (Sorkin & Robinson. 1984). That is, humans have eyes 
and noses; these senses allow different detection than automated detectors. 
Automated detectors are capable of sampling chemicals that the human can not 
sense. In this case the correlation would be close to zero (0). Sorkin and 
Robinson (1984) give the example of an automated chemical plant where the 
same unprocessed sensor data is available to both detectors. In this case the 
correlation would be close to one (1). In short, automated detectors and humans 
sample the air around them differently — if smoke alarms had olfactory senses 
then it might not be a big stretch to assume that if the same smoke particulates 
are being sampled then the correlation between automated detector and human 
would be closer to r = 1.0. This assumption holds true for other automated 
detector/human systems.
The Study
The following study investigated such factors as d'system when observers 
and machine were given either the same four numbers or four different numbers 
taken from the same distribution. Half the time the observer and computer 
were given the same four numbers and half the time they were given different 
numbers. Observers and the automated detector (in this case a computer) were 
expected to add these numbers and decide if the averaged sum came from one 
of two overlapping distributions. Observers were also given the computer's
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calculation to aid in their decision. Along with the detection task, observers 
were given an unstable tracking task. The logic behind employing a tracking 
task falls within the realm of dual-task paradigms. When an operator is given a 
task that divides attention among concurrent tasks, this, in principle, covers 
what is presumably a real-world situation of multiple tasks. By giving 
participants an unstable tracking task we attempted to simulate a real-world 
situation. When the tracking task requires fewer resources, more can be devoted 
to the detection task and performance on the detection should improve.
Predictions
The following were the predictions fo - this study.
Because each detector had unique information in the r = 0.0 condition, 
performance in the r = 0.0 condition should be greater than in the r = 1.0 
condition. Furthermore, d'system should be greater in the r = 0.0 condition than in
the r = 1.0 condition.
For the main effect of primary (tracking) task difficulty, performance on the 
easy tracking task will be better than on Che difficult tracking task.
For the interaction of primary task difficulty and correlation, easy r = 0.0 
will be better than easy r = 1.0; difficult r = 0.0 will be better than difficult r = 1.0; 
easy r= 0.0 will be better than difficult r -1.0; easy 0.0 will be better than
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difficult r = 0.0. Figure 14 depicts the primary task difficulty x correlation 
prediction. Figure 15 depicts the prediction that the primary task will remain 
stable across conditions. That is, as correlation increases performance will 
decrease. Moreover, the performance decrease will be more notable in the 
difficult tracking condition (CF Figure 14).
Discussion of the study follows.
Predicted d'
Correlation
Figure 14. Predicted d1 (system)
-Easy Tracking 
-Difficult Tracking
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Figure 15. Predicted primary task performance.
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CHAPTER II.
METHOD
Subjects
Four paid undergraduate volunteers were used as observers (subjects). 
Observers each had corrected vision to at least 20/40, and no known hearing 
deficiencies. Observers were paid based on a payoff schedule (approximately 
$6/ hour) one hour a day for 11 days. The total time span of the experiment was 
two weeks. There was one condition for every session. Each observer reported at 
the same time each day for his or her session.
The payoff schedule was based on d' and RMS. The outcome of the payoff 
schedule is that payment equaled roughly five dollars and fifty cents per hour 
for most observers. Minimum and maximum pay were $4.60 per hour and $6.65 
per hour respectively. Each observer was also given a $15 bonus for completing 
the study. The total payoff over the entire study (for all observers) was $298.90.
Treatment of the subjects was in compliance with the ethical standards set 
forth by the American Psychological Association (American Psychological 
Association, 1992), and the University of Dayton.
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Task
The following description is a step-by-step account of how the computer 
(software) stepped through the procedure:
At the beginning of the task the computer chose, with a 0.5 probability, 
either a signal or no-signal state. The computer then drew four samples, called 
the display samples, from the appropriate distribution (either signal or noise). In 
the r = 0 case, the computer drew four more samples from the same distribution. 
These are called the alarm (signal) samples. In the r = 1 case, the computer used 
the display samples as the alarm samples. The computer then calculated the 
mean of the four alarm samples. If the mean of alarm samples was greater than 
the unbiased Ca, the computer played a 700 Hz tone; otherwise it played a 500 
Hz tone. Simultaneous with the onset of the tone, the display samples were 
presented to the subject on the bottom of the CRT. The subject then decided if 
the information presented came from a distribution with a mean of 3 (no-signal) 
or a mean of 4 (signal). If "yes-signal" then subject pressed the '2' key with their 
left middle finger. If "no signal" then the subject pressed the ']/ key with their 
left index finger.
After responding, the subject received feedback whether their response 
was a "Hit, Miss, False alarm," or "Correct rejection." This feedback lasted two 
(2) seconds.
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Note. There was a primary task. The primary task, a continuous tracking task, 
was simultaneously presented. Subjects performed the tracking task with their 
dominant hand.
Figure 14 represents what the subject viewed on the CRT, as well as the 
keyboard.
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Figure 16. The observer's displays.
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Design
Subjects were instructed to perform two tasks concurrently. The primary task 
was a unidimensional manual tracking task (adapted from Sorkin, Kantowitz & 
Kantowitz, 1988) with two levels of difficulty (easy and difficult). The cursor 
movement was driven by a complex signal that is composed of the sum of either 
three (easy tracking) or five (difficult tracking) sinusoids.
Table 1 shows the components of the easy tracking task. Table 2 shows the 
components of the difficult tracking task.
Easy Tracking (3 sinusoids!
Amnlitude (characters! 20 15 5
Freauencv (Hz! 0.2 0,11 0.42
Phase (radians! Picked at random
Table 1. Easy tracking components.
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Difficult Tracking (5 sinusoids)
Amplitude (characters)_____20______ IQ_______3_______ 2_______ 5
Frequency (Hz)0,2 0.11 0.32 0.43 0.81
Phase (radians!Picked at random
Table 2. Difficult tracking components.
The secondary task, the monitored channel task (adapted from Sorkin & 
Robinson, 1984; Robinson & Sorkin, 1985; Sorkin et al 1988), was presented on 
the bottom portion of the CRT. Based on a uniform random time schedule with a 
mean of nine seconds, a display that consisted of four three-digit numbers 
between 0.00 and 8.00 (e.g. 0.01,1.42,4.20,6.67) appeared at the bottom of a
color monitor for 1.5s. The numbers were drawn from either a noise
distribution, or a signal plus noise distribution. The computer then drew 
samples from a normal distribution with a mean of 3.0 (noise) or a mean of 4.0 
(signal), with a standard deviation of 1.54; this depended on whether the
underlying system state was "no-signal" (x = 3.0) or "signal" (x = 4.0). The 
maximal d' on the hypothesis distribution, based on a four element array was 
1.3 (with each distribution having standard deviation of 1.54 and a mean
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difference of 1); this is the square root of the sum of the four squared d' values. 
The probability of a signal on any given trial was 0.5.
The second variable manipulated was the correlation between the alarm 
display's observations and the information available to the observer/subject
(r = 0, and r = 1). The monitoring task was compounded by the addition of an 
automated alarm. This alarm was a computer-portrayed subsystem that 
monitors the same distribution as the subject. The computer always sampled the 
same distribution (either signal or noise). In the case of r = 0.0, the computer 
viewed one sample, and the subject viewed a different sample. In the case of r=l, 
the computer and the subject viewed the same sample (adapted from a formula 
developed by Jeffress & Robinson, 1964). This resulted in a 2X2 (primary task 
difficulty x correlation) within-subjects design (Table 3 depicts the conditions). 
Table 4 shows the order of condition presentation.
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Tracking task difficulty
Correlation between 
alarm and human
easy primary (A) r = 0
difficult primary (B) r = 0
easy primary (C) r = 1
difficult primary (D) r= 1
easy primary only #########
difficult primary only #########
detection task only #########
Table 3. Condition breakdown.
Observer Testing position (day)
1 A B C D D C B A
2 C A D B B D A C
3 B D A C C A D B
4 D C B A A B C D
Table 4. Latin square of the presentation order of the conditions
In addition to the aforementioned, three control conditions were utilized:
easy primary tracking task only, difficult primary tracking task only, and 
detection task only.
Data analysis looked at d' as a performance measure of the monitored 
channel task. Performance on the tracking task was evaluated by recording root 
mean square (RMS) tracking error.
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With approximately seven ((9/60) = 6.66 « 7) trials per minute, there were 
around 33 trials per block.
Apparatus
This study was run on a Zenith Z248 CPU. The monitor was a Zenith Z1492 
color monitor with a diagonal screen size of 14in (35.56 cm). The VGA display 
was 640 x 480 pixels. Subject's visual angle was roughly 43°. Subject's eye to 
screen distance was approximately 45cm. The primary task was a mouse- 
controlled tracking task.
Procedure
After reading and agreeing to the terms on the informed consent form, 
subjects were then instructed on how to perform the tasks.
In order for subjects to be prepared for the experiment, each subject practiced 
three days. Day one was tracking without the alarm. Day 2 was the detection 
task without the primary tracking task. Day three was the combined tasks. Each 
subject had a different number of practice trials until they reach criterion (d' = 
0.8). Training also occurred before the start of data collection each day.
The payoff schedule was based on d' and RMS. The outcome of the payoff
schedule is that payment equaled roughly five dollars per hour for most
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observers. The equation was: [(d'*0. l)((5 - RMS)0.19)(0.35)] for the 3 sinusoid 
condition and [(d'*0.l)((5 - RMS)0.19)(.35) + $1.5] for the 5 sinusoid condition.
Subjects were instructed to perform two tasks concurrently during data- 
gathering. The primary task was a unidimensional manual tracking task in 
which they used a mouse control a "+" marker left or right. Subjects tried to 
follow a horizontally moving cursor with the "+" marker. Subjects performed 
the primary task continuously for approximately five minutes, using their right
hand.
Subjects were able to respond to a signal or no signal state at any time 
during the appearance of the display (each trial), and up to 0.5 s after 
termination. Each trial was followed by 2.0 seconds feedback. The monitor 
displayed one of the following messages after each trial: "Correct Detection," 
"Correct Rejection," "False Alarm, " or "Missed Signal."
When alerted by the computer, subjects heard a tone with either a 500Hz 
fundamental frequency or a 700Hz fundamental frequency. When the computer 
indicated there was a signal, subjects heard a tone with 700Hz fundamental 
frequency. When there was no signal the computer presented a tone with a 
500Hz fundamental frequency. Tone onset was synchronized to the onset of the 
monitoring task. The automated (signal) was 400ms in duration.
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Feedback, at the end of each block, consisted of information regarding: 
number of trials, correct detections, correct rejections, false alarms, missed 
signals, d', and average RMS error. Information was presented during a one- 
minute break between blocks. Subjects were rewarded for more accurate 
performances on the tracking task. The idea is that subjects would not be 
rewarded for large RMS values. These values were determined by looking at the
data on the baseline control condition.
53
CHAPTER III.
RESULTS
Data analysis
A 2X2 (primary task difficulty X correlation) repeated-measures factorial 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on each dependent variable. The 
dependent variables were RMS error and d'. All statistical tests were performed 
at a = .05. In order to minimize practice effects, only data from the last four 
days were analyzed.
Statistics for all four Observers
Since the automated detector and the human had unique information in 
the r = 0.0 (decorrelated) condition, d'system on the decorrelated condition should 
be greater than in the r = 1.0 (correlated) condition. As shown in Figure 17, this 
is not the case for either tracking condition where all four points nearly overlap. 
For d'system the main effect of correlation was not significant, F (1,3) = 0.119, p =
0.736, MS error = 0.298.
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Observers 1-4
Correlation
Figure 17. d' for observers 1 through 4.
■Easy Tracking 
-Difficult Tracking
The difficult tracking condition should require more resources than the 
easy tracking condition. Therefore, d'system should be greater in the easy 
tracking condition than in the difficult condition. Figure 17 does not support 
this. For d'system the main effect of tracking task difficulty was not significant, 
F(l, 3) = 0.001, p = 0.977, MS error = 0.298. The F ratio is quite small; it is likely 
because it is based on four subjects (which tends to make the standard error of 
the mean larger).
It was also predicted that d'system would be greater in the decorrelated
condition than in the correlated condition. Furthermore, this difference should 
be greater for the difficult tracking condition compared to easy tracking. Figure 
14 depicts the primary task difficulty x correlation prediction. However, the
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data, as shown in Figure 17, across all four observers are inconsistent with the 
predictions, F (1,3) = 0.002, p = 0.967, MS error = 0.29.
As predicted and shown in Figure 18, RMS error on the easy tracking task 
was better than on the difficult tracking task. Also, as predicted (figure 18), 
primary task performance remained stable across the manipulation of 
correlation. For RMS error, there was a main effect of tracking task difficulty (F 
(1,3) = 6.141, p = 0.029, MS error = 2.294). Figure 15 depicts the prediction that 
the primary task would remain stable across correlations).
Observers 1-4
r=0 r=1
Correlation
Figure 18. RMS error for observers 1 through 4.
'Easy Tracking 
‘Difficult Tracking
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P should remain stable across the correlation conditions, and overall, 
across observers and conditions. This was the case as shown in Figure 19. There 
were no main effects for P (correlation: F (1,3) = 0.572, £ = 0.464, MS error = 
0.033; tracking task difficulty: F (1, 3) = 0.013, £ = 0.911, MS error = 0.001). The 
interaction was not significant F (1,3) = 1.385, £ = 0.262, MS error = 0.81.
Observers 1-4
Figure 19. p for observers 1 through 4.
’Easy Tracking 
'Difficult Tracking
Observers 1 & 2, and 3 & 4
This section deals with observers 1 and 2, and observers 3 and 4 as two
separate groups. Overall, observers 1 and 2 appeared more motivated than their
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counterparts. Figure 20 shows that observers 1 and 2 performed notably better 
on the tracking dimension than observers 3 and 4. Also, Figure 20 illustrates that 
both groups were, as predicted, adhering to the primary task.
Observers 1&2 compared with 3&4
4
3.5 A-----------------—A
- - • - - Easy Tracking 1&2
3 - - - - Difficult Tracking 1&2
□ Easy Tracking 3&4
2.5
2
0..................... ..
■...............■
Difficult Tracking 3&4
1.5
1
r = 0 r=1
Correlation
Figure 20. RMS error for observers 1 and 2 compared with 
observers 3 and 4.
As predicted, primary task performance remained stable on the tracking 
dimension (Figure 20). It was predicted that since each detector would have 
unique information in the decorrelated condition, d' in the decorrelated 
condition would be greater than in the correlated condition. It was also 
predicted that d'system would be greater in the decorrelated condition than in the
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correlated condition; this prediction was upheld (Figure 21) for observers 1 and
2, but not for observers 3 and 4.
Observers 1&2 compared with 3&4
- - * - - Easy Tracking 1&2
- - -4- - - Difficult Tracking 1&2
□ Easy T racking 3&4
—A—-Difficult Tracking 3&4
Figure 21. d' for observers 1 and 2 compared with observers 3 and 4.
It was predicted that for the primary task difficulty by correlation 
interaction, d'system would be larger in the correlated condition than in the 
decorrelated condition. Moreover, the difference was predicted to be larger 
with difficult tracking than with easy tracking. For the data across all four 
observers this was not the case. Figure 21 shows that for observers 1 and 2 
d'system on easy decorrelated was about the same as d'system on difficult 
decorrelated. This is not the case of Observers 3 and 4, who were inconsistent
with predictions because the performance on the decorrelated dimension was 
worse than the correlated dimension (Figure 21). However, sensitivity on the
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correlated dimension was consistent with the predictions for observers 1 and 2 
(Figure 21).
It was predicted that d'system in the decorrelated condition would be 
greater than in the correlated condition. Also, d'system would be greater in the 
easy tracking condition than in the difficult tracking condition. The data for 
observers 3 and 4 (Figure 21) indicate that the findings are not consistent with 
these predictions. These two observers have low d'system. Whereas observers 1 
and 2 had notably higher d'system.
Since reaction time (RT) was not mentioned a priori as a dependent 
variable it was not analyzed inferentially. Moreover, with such a small subject 
sample size, the standard error of the mean across all four subjects is quite large.
However, RT will be discussed here in descriptive terms. Figure 22 illustrates 
the differences between observers 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 on RT. Observers 1 and 2 
contrast with the other two observers in terms of RTs. Average RT for observers
1 and 2 combined was 1323 ms, whereas RT for observers 3 and 4 combined was
802 ms.
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Observers 1&2 compared with 3&4
Figure 22. RT for observers 1 and 2 compared with observers 3 and 4.
—■—Easy Tracking 
Obs 3&4
—A—Difficult Tracking 
Obs 3&4
□ Easy Tracking 
Obs 1&2
- -A « Difficult Tracking 
Obs 1&2
Individual observers
The results for all four observers were somewhat inconclusive. Observer 1
had, by far, the best performance on the primary task. Observer l's d'SyStem and 
RMS error were the best of all of the observers. The rank ordering of observers 
on the d' dimension was observer 1 (1.498), observer 2 (1.454), observer 3 (0.671), 
and observer 4 (0.551). The rank order for RMS error (from best to worst) was: 
observer 1 (1.906; Figure 23), observer 2 (2.721; Figure 25), observer 3 (2.724; 
Figure 24), and observer 4 (3.293; Figure 26). The difference between observers 2 
and 3's RMS error was negligible. This will be described in the upcoming 
section. Figure 27 depicts RT collapsed across all four observers. The rank order 
for reaction time (RT) was: observer 4 (762.5 ms; Figure 28), observer 3 (842 ms;
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Figure 29), observer 2 (1318 ms; Figure 30), and observer 1 (1329.5; Figure 31). 
There is a trend in that as RT increases so does d'system (r = 0.888). The following 
section deals with each observer in the psychophysical tradition. Each observer 
will be described separately.
Observer 1
Figure 23. Observer l's RMS error.
'Easy Tracking 
‘Difficult Tracking
62
Observer 3
R
M
S E
rr
or
 
* 
R
M
S E
rr
or
24. Observer 3's RMS error.
Observer 2
Figure 25. Observer 2's RMS error.
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26. Observer 4's RMS error.
Observers 1-4
Figure 27. RT for observers 1 through 4.
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Figure 29. Observer 3's RT.
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Figure 31. Observer l's RT.
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Observer 1
This observer had the best performance on all of the dimensions (except 
RT, which will be discussed later). Observer l's d'system was the highest. It 
appears as if this observer was not experiencing a noticeable difference in 
tracking task difficulty. Comparison of Observer l's RMS error with d'system 
graphs confirms that this observer probably did not notice much difference in 
tracking task difficulty (Figure 23 and Figure 32). Observer l's d'system nearly 
overlaps at r = 0.0 and at r = 1.0. Difficult tracking may have been marginally
more difficult in the correlated condition.
Observer l's RT was slow enough compared with the other observers to
confirm that this observer was attending to the primary task (Figure 31).
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Observer 1
Correlation
Figure 32. d' for observer 1.
"Easy Tracking 
' Difficult Tracking
Observer 2
Observer 2's d'system was the least consistent with the predictions (compare 
Figure 33 with Figure 14). Observer 2's d'system results are the reverse of the 
predicted results. Again this may be the result of the tracking task. This 
observer may not have perceived the difficult tracking as being more difficult, 
even though his RMS error indicates a difference (Figure 25). Although the 
difficult tracking condition was "faster" the difference between the two 
conditions may not have been great enough to cause a performance decrement 
in this observer's tracking. Moreover, observer 2's performance decrement is 
not in the predicted direction -this too is an indication that the difficult tracking 
was not notably more difficult than the easy tracking task. Like observer 1,
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observer 2's RT was slower than the group average. This suggests observer 2 
was also attending well to the primary task.
Observer 2
Figure 33. d1 for observer 2.
"Easy Tracking 
‘Difficult Tracking
Observer 3
Unlike the first two observers, the combination of observer 3's depressed 
d'system (Figure 34) and quick RT (Figure 29) may suggest that this observer was 
either not fully attending to the primary task, or may not have felt that her 
performance on the primary task was very good and subsequently tried to 
compensate through the secondary task. Note however, RMS error was 
somewhat consistent with predictions (compare Figure 24 with Figure 15).
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Observer 3
Correlation
Figure 34. d' for observer 3.
"Easy Tracking 
'Difficult Tracking
Observer 4
This observer's performance, albeit above chance, is not particularly 
good. This observer's very high RMS error (Figure 26), low d'system (Figure 35), 
and low RT (Figure 28) indicate that she was either not fully attending to the 
primary task, or was guessing much of the time.
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Observer 4
Figure 35. d' for observer 4.
"Easy Tracking 
'Difficult Tracking
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DISCUSSION
This study attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to measure differences 
between correlated and decorrelated alarm systems. Previous studies have 
employed designs with purely decorrelated systems. This would theoretically 
result in high d'system.
There are number of factors that could have influenced the data, ranging 
from observer differences to potential design deficiencies. Some differences
between observers 1 and 2 and observers 3 and 4 that could have made a
difference in the outcome of the data are that observers 1 and 2 were
experienced computer users, whereas 3 and 4 were novice users. Observer 3 had 
never before used a mouse. Figure 36 shows observer 3's RMS error over the 11 
days of the Study (note: this observer's learning curve had only begun to level 
off by day 3 — and there were still perturbations at day 7). It is difficult to 
ascertain from the data whether observer 3's mousing skills were still improving 
through the last few days of the study. Regardless, this observer's RMS error 
was certainly not very good.
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Observer 3 RMS
Day
Figure 36. Observer 3's tracking performance over 11 days.
Inspection of the individual observers' data reveals that observers 3 and 4 
had very low d'system and exceptionally low reaction times. Furthermore, 
observers 3 and 4 had poor RMS error; especially compared to observers 1 and 
2. This suggests that observers 3 and 4 could have either been discouraged by 
their performance, or, based on their very low reaction times, not attending to 
the primary task. An alternate explanation, is that these observers may not have 
fully understood the task.
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Given that the signal mean was 4.0, the noise mean was 3.0, and the
standard deviation was 1.54, the elemental d' across all four observations was
1.3. Observer 3 (d' = 0.672) and observer 4's (d' = 0.551) d'system were 
substantially below this; whereas observer 1 (d' = 1.498) and Observer 2's (d' = 
1.454) d' were somewhat above this mark. This data could possibly support the 
notion that observers 3 and 4 did not fully understand the task since d' =1.3 is 
for the alarm alone; the d' = 1.498 and d' = 1.454 are for the human plus the 
alarm system. In the decorrelated case, d'system 6 = 1.84 —this means that 
observers were still below optimal.
The tracking task in this experiment may have been the greatest shortfall. 
Figure 18 suggests that although RMS error remained stable across correlation 
conditions (r = 0.0; r = 1.0), perhaps the difficult tracking task (5 sinusoids) was 
not difficult enough. There is not sufficient difference between the two 
conditions (3 sinusoid mean RMS error = 2.28; 5 sinusoid mean RMS error = 
3.038; mean RMS error difference = 1.028) to say that observers were given a 
difficult enough hard tracking task. The RT for the signal detection task while 
performing the difficult tracking task was faster than on easy tracking (3 
sinusoid mean RT = 1098.375 ms; 5 sinusoid mean RT = 1027.625 ms), suggesting 
that the difficult tracking required more attention. Had the t-test (to compare 
means for tracking) revealed significance, a faster RT may have indicated
d system ~ V2d’ iodi vidua = (1.414*1.3)
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greater attentional demands. With fewer resources, observers may not be able 
to allocate as much attention to the RT dimension thus forcing them to decide 
without having time to compute the mean. The time difference is inconclusive 
as to whether the difficult tracking was difficult enough. For example, observer 
l's RMS error data suggest that he did not perform much differently in the two 
tracking conditions. If this study were run again it may be beneficial to run the 
difficult condition using 7 sinusoids. Perhaps the tracking task itself could be 
changed. A multidimensional tracking task may serve as a better primary 
tracking task than a unidimensional task. A multidimensional tracking task 
may provide more discrete differences between easy and difficult conditions. 
Another possibility would be to employ a video game-like task as the primary 
task. With the right observers, games can capture their attention more 
"realistically." A tracking task has an artificial feel to it, whereas to some 
observers the task may be more engaging as a game.
Comparison of Figures 28, 29,30, and 31 (individual RT graphs) reveal 
marked differences between observers 1 and 2, and 3 and 4. Observer 3 and 4's
markedly lower times give reason to speculate that these two observers were 
not fully attending to the primary task. Another explanation is that they were 
guessing much of the time, which is also consistent with their d'system. The notion 
that observers 3 and 4 were not fully attending to the primary task is 
compounded by comparing the figures between observers 1 and 2, and 3 and 4
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(Figure 28 and Figure 31). Not only did observers 3 and 4 have considerably 
worse primary task performances (than observers 1 and 2), they had lower RT's. 
Lower RT's (compared with observers 1 and 2; Figure 22) suggests that they 
could have been attending more to the secondary task or they were relying more 
on the automated alarm and thus not as actively computing the mean of the four 
numbers as they could.
Other factors that could have been influential in the results stem from the
automated alarm. First, in the real-world alarms tend not to "buzz" if they do 
not believe/detect a signal. In this study the use of the 500Hz tone could have 
influenced observers, d'system may actually be higher in the decorrelated 
condition if this study were run again without the "no signal" tone. The second 
factor that may have influenced the data is that in the real-world, observers tend 
not to have to discriminate between signals that relate to the same alarm. 
Normally observers would hear an auditory alarm and not have to decide 
whether it is "yes-signal" or "no-signal."
It was discovered that in this study there were no significant differences
between the correlated and decorrelated groups.
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GLOSSARY
(3- The ratio of the height of the SN distribution to the height of the N 
distribution at C. ( p = [f (C | SN]/[/ (C | N)]).
C- The response criterion; C is also an arbitrary value. It is the value that 
partitions the Z statistic into "yes, there is a signal" and "no, there is no signal" 
categories. C is the response criterion parameter that specifies how much 
information is needed in order to come up with a "yes-signal."
Conservative detector- a detector that infrequently alerts that there is a signal. A 
detector whose criterion (C) is shifted toward the right of the mean of the two 
distributions.
d'- The mean of signal-plus-noise distribution minus the mean of the noise 
distribution divided by the standard deviation ( d' = (|1sn- |1n) / SD). d' is the 
sensitivity measurement. A d' value of 0 indicates performance at chance level, 
d' values above 2 are considered good; and d' values above 3 are considered 
very sensitive.
Liberal detector- a detector that frequently alerts that there is a signal. A detector 
whose criterion (C) is shifted toward the left of the mean of the two 
distributions.
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC's)- Plots of the probability of a hit versus 
the probability of a false alarm. These probabilities are computed based on a 
fixed d'. Ad' value of 0 indicates performance at chance level, d' values above 2 
are considered good; and d' values above 3 are considered very sensitive.
Signal detection theory (SDT)- A mathematical model that allows one to predict 
the probability that an observer will detect a signal embedded in noise.
Unbiased detector- a detector that has a criterion that is exactly between the mean 
of the signal distribution and the mean of the signal plus noise distribution. 
However, an unbiased detector is not always the mean of the distributions as it 
often depends on the payoff matrix and P(sig).
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Informed Consent to Participate as a Research Subject 
Project Title: Alarm Displays
Investigators: Paul ElRif (X2175) and Dr. Greg Elvers (X2171).
Please feel free to contact either myself or Dr.
Elvers (SJ 312) if you have any questions or problem regarding
this experiment.
Restrictions: No known hearing loss. Corrected vision to at least 20/40.
Description and Duration of the Experiment:
You will be seated at a computer for the duration of the experiment. You 
will be performing two tasks concurrently. The first task involves following a moving 
target on the computer monitor with a mouse. You will perform the primary task 
continuously for approximately five minutes, using your right hand. The second task 
involves listening for a one of two tones that will be presented by the computer. Also, 
the computer will be presenting a series of four three-digit numbers between 0.00 and 
8.00 (e.g. 0.01, 1.42, 4.20, 6.67) at the bottom of the computer monitor. These 
numbers are an aid in helping you decide the probability of a signal. Periodically you will 
be asked to make responses using the keyboard.
No adverse effects have been reported by students in previous 
experiments of this nature. However you may experience minor visual fatigue from 
concentrating on the computer screen.
This experiment will take one hour a day for twenty days (approximately 4 
weeks). The average student will earn around $5.50 an hour.
Confidentiality of the data:
Your name and other personal information will not be revealed to others. 
Your name will not be published in any documents.
Consent to participate:
I have voluntarily decided to participate in this experiment. Any and all of 
my questions regarding the procedures involved, and my participation have been 
adequately answered by the investigator. I understand that I may voluntarily terminate 
my participation in this experiment and I will still receive any monetary compensation 
that is owed me. I also understand that the investigators may terminate my participation 
at any time. Additionally, I certify that I am at least 18 years of age.
Name of subject (please print) Signature (please sign) SS#7 Date
Signature of witness
7For tax purposes only.
Date
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Debriefing Statement for Alarm Displays
In certain situations human operator workload can be heavy (e.g. on aircraft 
flight decks, or in a control room for a nuclear power plant (Sorkin & Robinson, 
1984; Sorkin & Woods, 1985). The addition of an automated detector (of 
abnormal events), in many cases, can arguably increase the likelihood of a hit 
as well as a false alarm ( Sorkin & Robinson, 1984; Sorkin & Woods, 1985).
Alerted monitor systems can be thought of as an automated 
detector that displays a message as to whether a set-point (a.k.a. threshold 
value) is exceeded. When the condition falls outside of the set range, the 
display alerts the operator. Once alerted, the human operator can analyze the 
situation and either confirm or disconfirm the automated alarm’s decision.
An alerted monitor system has two components. The components 
are an automated monitoring subsystem operating in conjunction with a human 
monitor. In an automated subsystem the operator is alerted by the automated 
alarm and makes a decision to confirm or ignore an alarm. This system 
acknowledges that the operator is probably engaged in tasks other than 
monitoring for a signal.
The human operator and the automated detector do not 
necessarily sample the same information. The data provided to the automated 
detector and to the human detector are sometimes not available to each other. 
For example the automated detector may have sophisticated data gathering and 
evaluation techniques that are not within the human’s capabilities. The 
measurement techniques of the automated detector and the human detector 
may also be different. Furthermore, the human detector may use heuristics or 
contextual data that the automated detector may not be capable of gathering.
Other differences between the automated and human detector 
include the difference in where the sample is extracted. In a kitchen, a smoke 
detector and a human operator are more likely to be sampling the same data; in 
this case the sampled information will be highly correlated. In the case of an 
alarm system in a large building, chances are the automated detector and the 
human operator will be sampling very different data; in this instance the 
correlation between the sampled information would be lower. In a chemical plant 
the automated detector is more likely to be sampling data that the human 
operator is not capable of monitoring (e.g. certain chemicals are odorless; this is 
an example of a low correlation between detectors).
Until now these types of studies have assumed that the automated 
alarm and the human observer are sampling distributions that are independent 
of each other. This study is looking at differences between correlated (r=1) and 
uncorrelated (r=0) observations of the automated alarm, and the human 
observer. In an actual system, the correlation between the observations of the 
human detector and the automated detector probably range from being 
moderately to highly correlated; using the smoke detector analogy, the detector 
is probably sampling air close to the ceiling, whereas the human is sampling air 
closer to the floor. The human observer can make visual checks, whereas the 
smoke detector can not. (Sorkin & Robinson. 1984). At the same time there will
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Debriefing Statement for Alarm Displays 
be situations where the smoke detector and the human are sampling air that is 
in the same room/sample (e.g. a smoky kitchen). Nevertheless, the smoke 
detector and the human detector are still sampling information in the same 
space.
Many times humans are to busy to attend to an alarm; in some 
instances if the alarm is an alarm that frequently goes off, the human may 
ignore it. This can lead to some very dangerous situations. This may have been 
the case in an Air Florida crash in 1982 where over 200 people were killed. On 
takeoff, the pilots ignored an alarm that indicated there was insufficient lift. Had 
the pilots acknowledged the alarm the problem could have been taken care of 
very easily. In cases like this it is better to signal even false alarms in order not 
to risk disaster.
If you have questions, comments, or are interested in this topic, please contact 
Paul EIRif SJ313 (X2175) or Dr. Greg Elvers SJ312 (X2171). This Study has 
been supervised by Dr., Greg Elvers.
Thank you for participating.
References:
Sorkin, R.D., Kantowitz, B.H., and Kantowitz, S.C. (1988). 
Likelihood Alarm Displays. Human Factors 30 (4), 445-459.
Sorkin, R.D., and Robinson D.E. (1984). Alerted Monitors: Human 
Operators Aided by Automated Detectors. U.S. Department of Transportation 
(University Research Program). Report# DOT/OST/P-34/85/021. Springfield: 
National Technical Information Service.
Sorkin, R.D., and Woods D.D. (1985). Systems With Human 
Monitors: A Signal Detection Analysis. Human-Computer Interaction (1) 49-75.
APPENDIX D
INSTRUCTIONS
86
Instructions for Alarm Displays
During most of the experiment you will be asked to perform two 
tasks at the same time. The most important and primary task is 
called a tracking task. The lesser important and secondary task 
is called a signal detection task.
Your primary task is to follow a target on the computer screen 
with a cursor. Imagine yourself flying an airplane that must 
follow another aircraft as it flies left and right. The target 
aircraft that you are following is represented as a plus sign (+) 
that moves back and forth. Your aircraft is represented as a 
solid block (■) that you control with a mouse (show the mouse.) 
You are to use your right hand to control the mouse. When you 
move the mouse to the right, the solid block (■) representing 
your aircraft will also move to the right; when you move the 
mouse to the left the solid block representing your aircraft will 
also move to the left. Your primary task is to keep your 
aircraft (the ■) as close to the target aircraft (+) as you 
possibly can.
At the end of each tracking session you will be given a number 
that represents how close, on average, your aircraft was to the 
target aircraft. Lower numbers represent better performance.
Your goal is to make and keep that number as low as possible. 
Your pay (chances of winning the prize) will be largely based on 
how low the number is.
The other, secondary task is called a signal detection task.
Again, imagine yourself flying the aircraft. In addition to 
following the other aircraft, you must sometimes also check to 
make sure that everything is okay with your aircraft.
Approximately every nine seconds, the computer will randomly 
decide whether your plane is okay or not. There will be a fifty- 
fifty chance that your plane is okay. If your plane is okay, the 
computer will randomly select four numbers from a normal 
distribution with a mean of three. This (show) is a normal 
distribution with a mean of three. The distribution shows the 
numbers that the computer can select across the bottom and the 
probability that the computer will select that number up the 
side. So the number that is most likely to occur is the number 
3. But other numbers are also probable. For example, the number 
2 will appear approximately 0.2% of the time when your plane is
87
okay; the number 4 will also appear approximately 0.2% of the 
time when your plane is okay.
If your plane is not okay, the computer will randomly select four 
numbers from a normal distribution with a mean of four. This 
(show) is a normal distribution with a mean of four. Again, the 
distribution shows how likely each number is, given that the 
plane is not okay.
Your task is to look at the four numbers and then to decide if 
the plane is okay or not. In general, the larger the four 
numbers are, the higher the probability is that the plane is not 
okay. In general, the smaller the four numbers are, the lower 
the probability is that the plane is okay. Notice however, that 
it is possible to get four fairly large numbers even when the 
plane is safe. It is also possible to get four fairly small 
numbers even when the plane is not okay. Thus, you cannot 
perform this task perfectly. You should try to perform it as 
well as you can, but do not get upset when you are incorrect.
Because of the difficulty of this task, sometimes the computer 
will help you in making your decision. When the automated alarm 
is active, the computer will beep whenever the four numbers are 
first displayed. The pitch of the beep will indicate whether the 
computer "believes" the aircraft is okay or not. If a lower 
pitch beep occurs, then the computer "believes" that the aircraft 
is okay; if a higher pitch beep occurs, then the computer 
"believes" that the aircraft is not okay. The computer will not 
always be accurate in its assessment of the situation; therefore, 
you should not solely rely on the beep unless you are so busy 
with the tracking task that you cannot attend to the numbers. 
Whenever possible, you should just use the beep as an additional 
piece of evidence in making your own decision about whether or 
not the aircraft is okay.
Whenever the four numbers appear, you are to decide if the plane 
is okay or not. If you think the plane is okay (that is, the 
numbers are fairly small), you are to press the 1 key on the 
numeric keypad with your left hand; If you think the plane is 
not okay (that is, the numbers are fairly large), you are to 
press the 2 key on the numeric keypad with your left hand. You 
should respond as best you can, but you cannot let your 
performance on the primary task suffer when you respond.
After you respond to the secondary task you will receive feedback 
about your performance. If the plane really was okay and you
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indicated that you thought it was okay, the computer will respond 
with "Correct Rejection." This means that you correctly 
identified that no malfunction had occurred. If the plane really 
was okay and you indicated that you thought it was not okay, the 
computer will respond with "False Alarm." This means that you 
indicated a problem existed when in fact none did.
If the plane really was not okay and you indicated that you 
thought it was okay, the computer will respond with "Missed 
Signal." This means that you failed to identify a problem with 
the plane. Finally, if the plane really was not okay and you 
indicated that it was not okay, the computer will respond with 
"Correct Detection." This means that you correctly identified a 
problem. Your pay for the day will increase slightly (your 
chances of winning the prize will increase slightly) for each 
correct rejection and for each correct detection that you make. 
Your pay for the day will decrease slightly (your chances of 
winning the prize will decrease slightly) for each false alarm or 
missed signal response that you make.
In summary, you will usually be performing two tasks at the same 
time. In the tracking task, you will attempt to follow a target 
aircraft (a plus sign +) with your aircraft (a solid block ■.)
You control your aircraft by moving the mouse with your right 
hand. You are to always perform the tracking task as well as you 
possibly can. In the signal detection task, four numbers will 
be displayed across the bottom of the screen. The larger the 
four numbers are, the higher the probability is that the aircraft 
is not okay. The smaller the four numbers are, the higher the 
probability is that the aircraft is okay. If you believe the 
aircraft is okay you are to press the 1 key on the numeric 
keypad with your left hand; if you believe the aircraft is not 
okay you are to press the 2 key on the numeric keypad with your 
left hand. It is always more important to keep your aircraft 
close to the target aircraft than it is to respond to the signal 
detection task.
